Officially the People’s Republic of China (PRC), China maintains that Taiwan is a part of China. Recently the anxiety in China has shifted from the idea of the Taiwanese government trying to regain control of China to the idea of Taiwan trying to declare independence.[ii] Since the 1970s, China has relied more on nationalism than anything else for legitimacy, making controlling Taiwan of utmost importance.[iii]
It considers Taiwan to be a “rebel province” and has “pledged to go to war rather than accept any declaration of Taiwanese independence.”[iv] China views it imperative that Taiwan reunify with China,[v] since doing so would go a very long way in erasing what China views as a humiliating history.[vi]
Finally, China wants to control Taiwan for geopolitically strategic reasons. First, China needs to control the passageways through the First Island Chain, of which Taiwan is a part of, since those can be blocked during wartime.[vii] Secondly, China views the East and South China Seas in the same hegemonic way that the United States viewed and currently views the Caribbean, and controlling Taiwan would facilitate their vision.[viii]
Officially the Republic of China (ROC), Taiwan is de facto independent, and has been so since 1949. One of Taiwan’s main national goals is to upgrade relations with all countries “in order to break the impasse of being excluded from much of the international community.”[ix] To do so, Taiwan has “conducted feverish, innovative diplomacy,” inviting former diplomats and journalists to Taiwan.[x]
Taiwan’s two main parties are split on Taiwan’s relationship with China. While both tout Taiwan’s sovereignty, the Kuomintang (KMT) is for closer relations with China and doesn’t support independence while the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) is more pro independence.[xi]
[i] “Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History: China’s Fight for Tiny Islands – The Taiwan Straits Crises, 1954-58,” Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, accessed June 25, 2017, http://adst.org/2016/08/chinas-fight-for-tiny-islands-quemoy-matsu-taiwan-straits-crises-1954-58/
[ii]Gideon Rachman, Easternization: Asia’s Rise and America’s Decline from Obama to Trump and Beyond (New York: Other Press, 2016), xvi.
[iii] Thomas J. Christensen, “Obama and Asia: Confronting the China Challenge,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 5 (September/October 2015), 28.
[iv] Rachman, Easternization, 42-43.
[v] James Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2014), 18.
[vi] Robert D. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2014), 148.
[vii] Tim Marshall, Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Explain Everything About the World (New York: Scribner, 2015), 54-55.
[viii] Robert D. Kaplan, Earning the Rockies: How Geography Shapes America’s Role in the World (New York: Random House, 2017), 155.
[ix] Brian Bridges and Che-Po Chan, “Looking North: Taiwan’s Relations with Japan under Chen Shui-Bian,” Pacific Affairs 81, no. 4 (Winter 2008-2009): 592, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40377629.
[x] Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 151.
[xi] Eleanor Albert, “China-Taiwan Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified December 7, 2016, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations.
The Communists under their leader, Mao Zedong pushed the Nationalists under their leader, Chiang Kai-shek out of the Mainland, forcing the Nationalists to move to Taiwan to continue their fight.[i] Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949.[ii]
1954-1955 – First Taiwan Straits Crisis
China attacked Taiwanese forces on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu.[iii] The Taiwanese controlled these islands, also known as Jinmen and Mazu in order to prevent an invasion of Taiwan.[iv] The United States and Taiwan signed a mutual defense treaty.[v] Additionally, the U.S. Navy helped evacuate the Dachen Islands in 1955, ending the crisis.[vi]
1958 – Second Taiwan Straits Crisis
China shelled Quemoy and Matsu from August to October and U.S. forces arrived again.[vii] The crisis arose over China trying to eliminate the threat the Taiwanese forces on Quemoy posed to Chinese trade.[viii] In response, the U.S. sent a large naval force, including 5 aircraft carriers, to the area, and aided in resupplying the Taiwanese islands that were under attack.[ix] Over 3000 soldiers were killed or wounded on both sides, and over 100 civilians were killed during the crisis, which ended due to the economic implosion of China as a result of the Great Leap Forward.[x] During the crisis, the United States issued nuclear threats to China over Taiwan.[xi] The United States was coming into its own as a superpower during this period, and recognized Taiwan’s strategic importance as a deterrent to China, and especially during and after the Korean War.[xii]
1971 – China Joins the United Nations
China joined the UN forcing Taiwan out, meaning Taiwan was no longer represented in this international body.[xiii] The General Assembly voted to recognize the PRC’s right to the China seat, ending two decades of debate over which government should represent China at the UN.[xiv]
1979 – Chinese establishes diplomatic elations with the United States
Following the establishment of relations, and the U.S. cut relations with Taiwan; a few months later, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act committing the U.S. to Taiwan’s security.[xv]
1982 – Third Joint Communiqué
The statement released by the U.S. and China indicated the U.S. would reduce arms sales to Taiwan.[xvi]
1992 – 1992 Consensus
An agreement between China and Taiwan was reached that there was One China, with different interpretations of what that meant, meaning that both sides could claim to be the true China.[xvii]
1995-1996 – Third Taiwan Straits Crisis
China conducted a series of live missile firings and mock invasions in the summer of 1995 and spring of 1996 during the run up to the 1996 Taiwanese presidential election.[xviii] In response, the United States sent the Independence and Nimitz carrier strike groups to the area.[xix] This was the biggest display of U.S. power in the region since the Vietnam War, and was crucial in forcing China to back down.[xx]
1998 – Three No’s
U.S. President Clinton issued his Three No’s (no Taiwanese independence, no Two China policy and no Taiwanese membership in organizations requiring statehood).[xxi]
2000 – Taiwanese presidential election
Chen Shui-Bian, the Democratic People’s Party presidential candidate won the Taiwanese Presidential election, bringing the DPP to the presidency for the first time.[xxii]
2005 – U.S.-Japan joint statement
The U.S. and Japan declared that the peaceful resolution of issues in the Taiwan Strait was a common strategic objective,[xxiii] followed by the Chinese passing the Anti-Secession Law stating that China would use force to prevent Taiwanese independence if necessary.[xxiv]
2007 – Chen’s actions and Chinese actions
Chen indicated that Taiwan wanted to become independent, followed by the U.S. and China jointly opposing a referendum on Taiwan’s membership in the UN under the name “Taiwan” in September.[xxv]
2013 – Chinese maritime revision
China revised its 9-dash line to a 10-dash line including Taiwan.[xxvi]
2016 – Taiwanese presidential election
The DPP beat the KMT and the DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen became president.[xxvii]
[i] Bruce E. Elleman, Taiwan Straits: Crisis in Asia and the Role of the U.S. Navy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 1.
[ii] Ibid., 15
[iii] “Chronology | Dangerous Straits | FRONTLINE | PBS,” Public Broadcasting Service, accessed June 25, 2017, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/china/etc/cron.html.
[iv] Elleman, Taiwan Straits, 22.
[v] “Chronology | Dangerous Straits | FRONTLINE | PBS”
[vi] Elleman, Taiwan Straits, 64-65.
[vii] Chronology | Dangerous Straits | FRONTLINE | PBS,”
[viii] Elleman, Taiwan Straits, 92.
[ix] Ibid., 93-94.
[x] Ibid., 97-98.
[xi] Steinberg and O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve, 152.
[xii] Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 163.
[xiii] David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 120-123.
[xv] Dangerous Straits.
[xvii] Albert, “China-Taiwan Relations.”
[xviii] Elleman, Taiwan Straits, 128-131.
[xix] Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 147.
[xx] Rachman, Easternization, 42-43.
[xxi] Steinberg and O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve, 13.
[xxii] Bridges and Chan, “Looking North,” 582.
[xxiii] Ibid., 591.
[xxiv] Albert, “China-Taiwan Relations.”
[xxv] Bridges and Chan, “Looking North,” 593-594
[xxvi] Rachman, Easternization, 54.
[xxvii] Jacques DeLisle, “Taiwan’s 2016 Elections and Cross-Strait Relations,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, last modified February 4, 2016, http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/taiwans-2016-elections-and-cross-strait-relations/.
1992 – 1992 Consensus
Representatives of China and Taiwan met and ended up agreeing to the statement that both sides “consider themselves part of a single Chinese nation, but each side embraces a different interpretation of what that means.”[iii] The statement allowed both sides to agree that there was one China, while allowing both sides to disagree on the legitimate governing body.[iv] The underlying agreement here was that Taiwan would not seek independence.[v] This mediation attempt can be considered a success due to the fact that Taiwan has not sought independence yet and parties on both sides generally continue to accept the consensus.
[i] Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 154.
[ii] Eugene Scott, “China: No negotiation on ‘One China’ policy despite Trump remarks,” CNN, last modified January 14, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/14/politics/donald-trump-one-china-taiwan/index.html.
[iii] Javier C. Hernández, “China Suspends Diplomatic Contact With Taiwan,” The New York Times, last modified June 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/world/asia/china-suspends-diplomatic-contact-with-taiwan.html.
[iv] Albert, “China-Taiwan Relations.”
2008-2016 – Ma Ying-Jeou’s presidency
Ma worked to strengthen relations between Taiwan and China.[i] Economic links have been greatly strengthened, with 21 agreements being signed between the two sides, including the 2010 Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.[ii] This agreement sought to reduce barriers to trade and investment between the two sides.[iii]
2014 – Trade and interaction milestones
Bilateral trade reached over $198 billion, and there were almost 900 flights a week between Taiwan and China, both part of China’s plan to tie Taiwan economically to China to the point where cutting ties would be too costly.[iv]
2016 – Tsai Ing-wen refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus
In response to Ing-wen’s actions, the Chinese suspended all diplomatic contact with Taiwan in response to exert pressure.[v]
2016 – Trump-Tsai phone call:
After he won the presidential election, Donald Trump had a phone conversation with Tsai in December, breaking over 40 years of tradition.[vi]
2017 – Liaoning passage
In January, Taiwanese jets and their navy were scrambled when China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning entered the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, ostensibly returning from training but also sending a strong military message to Taiwan.[vii]
2017 – Chinese international organization pressure
China continually tried to apply pressure to Taiwan, preventing it from attending the annual World Health Organization meeting, holding Taiwanese activists without charges, extraditing Taiwanese fraud suspects from other countries and restricting the number of Chinese tourists going to Taiwan in an effort to hurt the Taiwanese economy.[viii]
2017 – Panama switches recognition
Panama, one of the 21 countries that recognize Taiwan announced in June that it was breaking relations with Taiwan in order to establish diplomatic relations with China.[ix] This move has reduced the number of countries formally recognizing Taiwan as an independent nation to 20.
These tensions have also been fed by the military situation. While it is peaceful now, China and Taiwan are both ready for war if it should occur. In recent years, Beijing has greatly increased the missile threat to Taiwan, placing 1,000 missiles across the coast from Taiwan, which only has 100-200 interceptors.[x] China has also been working on its amphibious capabilities, though those may be more for intimidation than actual use.[xi]
Taiwan has spent around 2.2% of GDP on defense.[xii] But, Taiwan has very strong coastal defenses, with members of the Ministry of National Defense stating, “If they [the Chinese] tried [to invade], they would have the same horrible experience of U.S. Marines assaulting Japanese-held islands in the Pacific in World War II.”[xiii] This will likely be a deterrent to China regarding an outright invasion, coupled with John Mearsheimer’s “stopping power of water” argument, which states that even if a state can build a naval force and transport an army across it, it will be incredibly difficult to land the army on a hostile shore and subdue a hostile population.[xiv]
Taiwan’s young population has little sense of connection with China.[xv] Almost 60% of residents consider themselves exclusively Taiwanese, and the portion considering themselves half or whole Chinese has fallen.[xvi] However, there has been very low support recently for outright independence from Taiwan.[xvii]
[i] Shu Keng and Gunter Schubert, “Agents of Taiwan-China Unification?: The Political Roles of Taiwanese Business People in the Process of Cross-Strait Integration,” Asian Survey 50, no. 2 (March/April 2010): 287, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2010.50.2.287.
[ii] Elleman, Taiwan Straits, 143-144.
[iii] Ibid., 207
[iv] Albert, “China-Taiwan Relations.”
[v] Hernández, “China Suspends Diplomatic Contact With Taiwan.”
[vi] Rachman, Easternization, xv.
[vii] J.R. Wu, Faith Hung, and Michael Martina, “Taiwan scrambles jets, navy as China aircraft carrier enters Taiwan Strait,” Reuters, last modified January 11, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-carrier-idUSKBN14V061.
[viii] Ralph Jennings, “China is tightening the screws on Taiwan. Here are the ways it is exerting pressure,” The Los Angeles Times, last modified May 8, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-taiwan-china-tensions-20170508-htmlstory.html.
[ix] Michael D. McDonald and Keith Zhai, “Panama to Establish Ties With China in Latest Blow to Taiwan,” Bloomberg, last modified June 13, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-13/panama-to-open-ties-with-china-in-blow-to-taiwan-report-says.
[x] Steinberg and O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve, 111.
[xi] Ibid., 108.
[xii] Ibid., 87.
[xiii] Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 152.
[xiv] Ibid., 7.
[xv] DeLisle, “Taiwan’s 2016 Elections.”
[xvi] Albert, “China-Taiwan Relations.”
[xvii] DeLisle, “Taiwan’s 2016 Elections.”
The United States has the biggest stake in this dispute, due to the Taiwan Relations Act. The United States is the defender of Taiwan and if China does attack, the United States will almost certainly come to Taiwan’s aid. Officially the U.S. recognizes the One China policy contingent on its establishing diplomatic relations with China in 1979,[i] but states that any resolution of the dispute must be peaceful.[ii]
The United States has sold Taiwan over $46 billion in arms since 1990, which is part of the U.S. strategy to keep Taiwan well defended.[iii] A well-defended Taiwan backed by the U.S. will always be a check on China’s rise. This has consistently created tension with China, who is averse to the arms sales and has suspended military dialogues and threatened retaliation against the U.S. firms who make the weapons.[iv] China’s efforts to raise the stakes for the U.S. include developing satellites that can guide missiles at aircraft carriers[v] in an effort to dissuade the U.S. from entering the Strait in times of crisis and/or war.[vi]
President Trump’s phone call with President Tsai-Ing Wen complicated the U.S. position on Taiwan. In a bid to placate China, President Trump reaffirmed the One China Policy in February and rejected the possibility of another call with the Taiwanese president, due in part to Trump aiming to keep China cooperating on the issue of North Korea.[vii]
However, the U.S. will continue to have a major stake in Taiwan for credibility’s sake if nothing else. If U.S. allies, especially in Asia, see the U.S. back down from their position on Taiwan, it could send a signal that the U.S. is weakening and be a cause for alarm and reevaluation by America’s allies, which would deeply hurt U.S. abilities to project its power in the region.[viii]
While Japan officially recognizes China as a nation, Japan and Taiwan have had relatively close ties, and deteriorating relations with China have pushed the two even closer.[ix] Japan and Taiwan have strong economic ties, more than doubling between 1990 and 2006.[x] Politically, Japan had been attracted to Taiwan over Taiwan’s democratization in the 1990’s.[xi] Economically, Japan has a major stake in the dispute. Almost 60% of Japan’s energy supplies pass through the Taiwan Strait or in the waters near Taiwan, meaning that keeping the Strait open is imperative to Japan.[xii] To a lesser extent, Japan has reason to worry that a China that controls both sides of the Strait would put Japan’s energy supplies at China’s mercy.[xiii] Strategically, improving ties with Taiwan is part of Japan’s attempt to deter China.[xiv]
Japan’s ties with China complicate its position. Japan’s relationship with China is very important, and is cautious over provoking China over Taiwan.[xv] Japan’s economic ties with China far surpass those it has with Taiwan, and Japan will not risk that hurting Sino-Japanese relations for Taiwan.[xvi]
States of Southeast Asia:
Almost all of the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) states have territorial disputes with China over the islands in the South China Sea. While ASEAN does not address the dispute between China and Taiwan directly due to it being in East Asia and not Southeast Asia, they watch the situation very closely.[xvii] Many people call Taiwan the “political and military bellwether of the region,” indicating that the states with territorial disputes have reason to worry that if Taiwan is lost, their claims could be in extreme jeopardy as well.[xviii]
[i] Steinberg and O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve, 9.
[ii] Ibid., 35.
[iii] Albert, “China-Taiwan Relations.”
[iv] Steinberg and O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve, 21.
[v] Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 26.
[vi] Ibid., 177.
[vii] Jeff Mason, Stephen J. Adler, and Steve Holland, “Exclusive: Trump Spurns Taiwan President’s Suggestion of Another Phone Call,” Reuters, last modified April 27, 2017, http://reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-taiwan-exclusive-idUSKBN17U05I
[viii] Steinberg and O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve, 133.
[ix] Bridges and Chan, “Looking North,” 585.
[x] Ibid., 586.
[xi] Qingxin Ken Wang, “Taiwan in Japan’s Relations with China and the United States after the Cold War,” Pacific Affairs 73, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 360, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2672024.
[xii] Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 9-10.
[xiii] Wang, “Taiwan in Japan’s Relations with China and the United States after the Cold War,” 361.
[xiv] Bridges and Chan, “Looking North,” 587.
[xv] Wang, “Taiwan in Japan’s Relations with China and the United States after the Cold War,” 373.
[xvi] Bridges and Chan, “Looking North,” 594.
[xvii] Jörg Friedrichs, “East Asian Regional Security: What the ASEAN Family Can (Not) Do,” Asian Survey 52, no. 4 (July/August 2012): 773, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2012.52.4.754.
[xviii] Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 143.
Finally, it is predicted that Tsai Ing-wen will continue to refuse to outright accept the 1992 Consensus. A poll in Spring 2017 found that around 70% of Taiwanese did not accept the 1992 Consensus and were becoming increasingly anti-Chinese.[iii]
It is recommended that Taiwan continue on the path of no unification or independence, since that has worked in Taiwan’s favor and allowed it to become one of the most advanced economies in the region.
China should consider tempering its expectations of Taiwan. Instead of forcing the 1992 Consensus, China should develop two expectations for Taiwan, depending on whether the KMT or DPP are in power. When the KMT are in power, China should seek the 1992 Consensus, since the KMT were the ones in power when it was first agreed upon. When the DPP is in power, China should seek the status quo as the basis for Sino-Taiwanese relations. Tsai Ing-wen has indicated that she wants to maintain the peaceful status quo between China and Taiwan.[iv]
China should the fact that Tsai Ing-wen will not aim for independence and prevent relations from deteriorating to a point where this could change. It is recommended that China reopen diplomatic contact with Taiwan by opening what Beijing calls the “cross strait communication mechanism.”[v] It is especially important that the link between the channels of communication between the two sides, namely the link between China’s Taiwan Affairs Office and Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council.[vi] More diplomatic contact between the two means a peaceful resolution is a greater possibility. With reunification being an all but impossible result, a period of protracted smooth relations with China is the closest thing to a resolution of the conflict.
Building on this, both sides could reduce tensions and further the likelihood of a peaceful resolution by reducing the amount of offensive weapons both sides have aimed at each other across the Taiwan Strait. A visible reduction of weaponry would indicate that both sides want to resolve the issue peacefully and not through violence. A positive side effect of this move would be an increase in regional stability, especially by reducing the threat to ships passing through the strait to South Korea and Japan.
Finally, in November 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-Jeou met in Singapore, signaling the first talks between the premiers of the two sides in 60 years.[vii] In these talks, Ma proposed a cross-strait hotline.[viii] It is recommended that talks at the premier level be continued as they are often productive, but are more important symbolically to show continued interest in peace.
[i] Ibid., 131.
[ii] Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (March/April 2015): 80.
[iii] “A Year in Office, Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen Faces Surge in Anti-China Sentiment,” The Straits Times, last modified May 19, 2017, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/a-year-in-office-taiwans-tsai-ing-wen-faces-surge-in-anti-china-sentiment.
[iv] Hernández, “China Suspends Diplomatic Contact with Taiwan.”
[vii] “China and Taiwan Leaders Hail Historic Talks,” BBC News, last modified November 7, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34742680.
[i] “China Demands US Nix Arms Deal with Taiwan, Respect “one-China” Policy,” CBS News, last modified June 30, 2017, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-demands-us-nix-taiwan-arms-weapons-deal-one-china-policy/.
[ii] Ben Blanchard, “China Upset About ‘negative’ Taiwan Content in U.S. Defense Bill, Reuters, last modified July 17, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-taiwan-idUSKBN1A20QA
[iii] “After Spate of Chinese Patrols, Taiwan Says It’s Prepared to Defend Itself,” Reuters, last modified July 25, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china-security-idUSKBN1AA0FX
This article by two professors of government at Dartmouth College looks at the competition between the United States and China and why the United States will remain on top, which plays into the security of East Asia. It defends America’s place as a superpower today and in the future.
-Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis, edited by Suisheng Zhao.
A National Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution provides the reader with a series of essays ranging from Taiwan’s policies on China to the effect of the Crisis on U.S. security policy in this book.
–Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization by John W. Garver.
A professor of international affairs at Georgia Institute of Technology looks at the history behind the Third Taiwan Straits Crisis, the strategy of both the U.S. and China and the implications of Taiwan’s democratization for all the countries involved.
-“China’s Ambitions, America’s Interests, Taiwan’s Destiny, and Asia’s Future” by Edward Friedman, Asian Survey, Vol. 53, No. 2 (March/April 2013).
A Chinese foreign policy specialist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, in explores the arguments for and against the United States continuing to arm Taiwan, as well as America’s place in the region and what its relationship with China means for the rest of the states in the Asia-Pacific region.
-“Competing Narratives, Identity Politics, and Cross-Strait Reconciliation” by Yinan He, Asian Perspective, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2010).
An associate professor of international relations at Lehigh University explores the differing historiographies between Taiwan and China, and especially looks at Taiwan’s unique history before the Japanese colonization of Taiwan in 1895.
– The chapter titled “Power, responsibility and sovereignty: China’s policy towards Taiwan’s bid for a UN seat” by Baogang He in Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy edited by Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin.
The head of Public Policy and Global Affairs at Nayang Technological University in Singapore and Chair in International Studies at Deakin University in Australia explores the competition between Taiwan and China over representation at the UN, gives insight on China’s position and goes so far as proposing two seats at the UN: one for China and one for Taiwan.